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A model had been considered where there is price competition between two 
manufacturers and one retailer. Subsequently, this model was extended by including 
price competition between two manufacturers and two retailers. Moreover, price and 
service competition had been studied where there are two manufacturers producing 
competing products and selling them through a common retailer. The consumer 
demand depends on two factors: (1) retail price and (2) service level provided by the 
manufacturer. 
 
In this study, a channel structure in which there are duopoly manufacturers and 
duopoly common retailers in competition between channel members under wholesale 
price and retail’s margin and service provided by retailer was studied. Customer 
demand depends on two factors: (1) price and (2) service level provided by the 
retailer. Both of these manufacturers produce competing products and sell their 
products to both common retailers. This study focuses on the role of service provided 
by the retailer, how the bargaining power can affect the decision variables and 
channel member’s profit, when there is competition between the retailers service and 
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margin and manufacturers price (decision variables). To overcome this problem a 
solution on the effect of bargaining power to supply chain equilibrium was studied. 
The demand function model was developed by considering service by retailer in 
duopoly retailer channel structure. The effect of bargaining power on equilibrium 
solution when the manufacturer or the retailer is a leader, and the effect of increase 
production cost and market base and price and service competition index on the 
channel’s decision variables was determined. The game theory approach was used to 
derive equilibrium solutions for wholesale prices, retailer margins and service, and 
profits for each channel member. To study the effect of bargaining power in this 
supply chain equilibrium solution, Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, 
and Vertical Nash were used. In this study, it was shown that customers receive the 
least benefit from service when the retailer is leader. They are better off when the 
manufacturer is leader. The effect of changes in price competition indexes (b , p θ p ), 
service competition indexes (b , s θ s ), production cost ( ), and market base ( ) on 
market sensitivity were analyzed. The result showed that when c  of one 
manufacturer increases, the firm can sell its product at a higher price and with lower 
quantity but its competitor benefits. By increasing the market base of one of the 
manufacturers, the wholesale and retail price increase. When customer tends to 
choose a product with lower price, the manufacturer sells its product with lower 
wholesale price. Since, it was assumed that the cost of providing service increases by 
the power of 2, it is not economical to invest in service. Therefore, by increasing 
ci aij
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θ s  
and  b  the service level first increases and then decreases.  s
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Tiga faktor utama dalam menggambarkan sifat persaingan:  (1) struktur saluran, (2) 
kepimpinan saluran dan (3) persaingan produk dan simpanan. Suatu model telah 
diambilkira di mana persaingan harga di antara dua pengeluar dan satu peruncit. 
Seterusnya, model ini dilanjutkan dengan mengambilkira harga persaingan antara 
dua pengeluar dan dua peruncit. Tambahan pula, kajian antara persaingan harga dan 
perkhidmatan telah dibut mana terdapat dua pengeluar menghasilkan produk yang 
sama dan menjualnya terus kepada seorang peruncit. Permintaan pengguna 
bergantung kepada dua faktor: (1) harga runcit dan (2) tahap perkhidmatan yang 
disediakan oleh pengeluar. 
Dalam kajian ini, struktur saluran yang mana terdapat dua pengeluar dan dua 
peruncit bersaing di bawah harga jualan borong dan margin runcit serta 
perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh peruncit telah dikaji. Permintaan pengguna 
bergantung kepada dua faktor: (1) harga dan (2) tahap perkhidmatan yang disediakan 
oleh peruncit. Kedua-dua pengeluar ini menghasilkan produk yang sama dan 
menjualnya kepada kedua-dua peruncit. Kajian ini memfokuskan kepada peranan 
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perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh peruncit, bagaimana kuasa tawar-menawar boleh 
memberi kesan kepada perubahan sesuatu keputusan dan keuntungan anggota 
saluran, apabila terdapat persaingan antara perkhidmatan para peruncit dan margin 
serta harga pengeluar (pembolehubah keputusan). Model fungsi permintaan telah 
dibangunkan dengan mengambil kira perkhidmatan oleh peruncit dalam struktur 
saluran peruncit duopoli. Kesan daripada kuasa tawar-menawar dalam proses 
penyelesaian seimbang apabila pengeluar atau peruncit mendahului dan kesan 
daripada peningkatan kos pengeluaran dan dasar pasaran dan harga serta indeks 
persaingan perkhidmatan kepada pembolehubah keputusan saluran telah 
dikenalpasti. Pendekatan teori game  telah digunakan untuk memperolehi keputusan 
seimbang untuk jualan harga borong, margin peruncit dan perkhidmatan serta 
keuntungan untuk setiap anggota saluran. Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer 
Stackelberg dan Vertical Nash telah digunakan untuk mengkaji kuasa tawar-
menawar dalam keputusan seimbang rantaian bekalan. Dalam kajian ini, ia 
menunjukkan bahawa apabila peruncit mendahului para pengguna menerima 
keuntungan yang paling kecil daripada perkhidmatan. Pengguna akan mendapat 
keuntungan yang lebih bila pengeluar mendahului. Kesan perubahan terhadap indeks 
persaingan harga ( , b p θ p ), indeks persaingan perkhidmatan ( , bs θ s ), kos 
pengeluaran ( c ) dan dasar pasaran ( ) dalam kepekaan pasaran telah dianalisis. 
Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa apabila  pengeluar meningkat, syarikat tersebut 
boleh menjual produk mereka pada harga yang tinggi dengan kuantiti yang lebih 
rendah. Dengan meningkatkan dasar pasaran pengeluar, jualan borong dan harga 
peruncit juga turut bertambah. Apabila pelanggan cenderung untuk memilih sesuatu 
produk dengan harga lebih rendah, pengeluar akan menjual produk mereka dengan 
harga borong. Ianya telah diandaikan bahawa tidak ekonomikal untuk melabur dalam 
i aij
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perkhidmatan oleh kerana peningkatan kos persediaan perkhidmatan dengan kadar 
dua kali ganda. Tahap perkhidmatan meningkat dan kemudian menurun dengan 
peningkatan θ s  dan .  bs
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Study 
 
Emphasis in business has swung towards those strategies that can create long-term 
costumer loyalty as the main focus. The recognition that customer retention is the 
key to long-term profitability has brought with it an understanding of the critical 
importance of customer service. Customer today is very demanding and asks for 
more and more value. The capability required for market entrance and leadership has 
changed from ability to supply to ability to add more and more value to the customer 
(Altekar, 2006).  
 
Today, independent retailers sell most consumer goods who also sell other 
competing brands (substitutes). Their normally goals have conflict from those of the 
manufacturers. These retailers are often much larger than many manufacturers, and 
are gaining more influence on distributing and pricing the product. On the other 
hand, in some markets manufacturers have more power than the retailer and their 
decisions influence the pricing and distributing of products (Choi, 1996).  
 
Conditional upon the situation in any particular industry, the bargaining power of 
retailers and manufacturers can vary significantly. Variation in bargaining power in a 
particular supply chain can create three scenarios following the notions in (Choi, 
1991; Charoensiriwath, 2004): 
 
 1
1) Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS): The manufacturers possess more bargaining 
power than the retailer and thus are the Stackelberg leader. In this situation, both of 
the manufacturers have equal bargaining power.  
 
2) Retailer Stackelberg (RS): The retailer has more bargaining power than the 
manufacturers and is the Stackelberg leader.  
 
3) Vertical Nash (VN): The bargaining power is equal for both the manufacturer and 
the retailer. 
 
Due to current dynamic and competitive environment, manufacturers must compete 
with more complicated strategies than lowering their price with their rival. Non-price 
factors such as service have become more effective in a consumer’s preference to 
buy a product than other. Product price is not only concerns for end customer, but 
one of the major concerns for them is how good product service (the after-sale and 
repair service) is. A manufacturer must consider issues such as competitive pressure 
from other manufacturers and their channel coordination with retailer in their 
decision processes as well. 
 
Post-sale customer support, product advertising, improved product quality, on-time 
product delivery, responsive product repair, guideline about how to install or use the 
product, maintenance service, or warranty  and guaranty repairs, free repair, faster 
check-out, etc is included as example of services. The consumer’s perceived value of 
the product can be increased by each of these services. As mentioned above, these 
 2
retailers are more effective on amount of sell of goods so the service can be provided 
by these retailers for customer. 
 
A model that included price (decision variable) competition with two manufacturers 
and a single retailer has been analyzed by Choi (1991). This study focuses on the 
effects of retailer power that occur as a result of dealing with multiple products. Choi 
(1996) extended Choi’s (1991) analysis by including price competition between 
duopoly common retailers. A model with two manufacturers and two retailers has 
been analyzed. Its focus was on the intra- and inter-channel price competition instead 
of channel coordination. 
 
Charoensiriwath (2004) studied a case where there are two manufacturers producing 
competing products and selling them through a common retailer. The consumer 
demand depends on two factors: (1) retail price and (2) service level provided by the 
manufacturer. They extended Choi (1991) by adding a service factor. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Choi (1996) analyzed price competition where there are two manufacturers and two 
retailers. He considered effect of bargaining power on his model’s decision variables.  
 
As Charoensiriwath (2004) mentioned, “Because, the potential impact from the 
service quality to consumer demands, negotiations between the manufacturer and 
retailer on their price and order quantity will be affected. Moreover, competitive 
pressure from other manufacturers and their channel coordination with retailer are 
 3
issues that a manufacturer must consider in their decision processes.” They studied 
competition under manufacturer service and retail price in channel structure that are 
two manufacturers and a common retailer. They considered the effect of bargaining 
power in their supply chain.  
 
Consequently, this study focused on the role of service provided by the retailer and 
how bargaining power can affect the decision variables and channel members profit, 
where there is competition between the retailers service and margin and 
manufacturers price. 
 
This research explored the role of bargaining power in supply chain strategy 
interactions and investigated. It took into account the strategic behavior of firms 
when the manufacturer posses more bargaining power than the retailer, when the 
retailer posses more bargaining power than the manufacturer, and when both of them 
have equal bargaining power. Details of this investigation are explained in chapter 3.  
 
1.3 Objective 
 
In a market with a monopolist or a group of oligopolists, more bargaining power 
would be possessed by the manufacturers than the retailers. He would be able to sell 
their product by adding some charges above the competitive price. On the other 
hand, the manufacturer’s profit can be brought down, when the retailers possess 
more negotiation power, He will absorbed more to the profit. By developing a 
demand function model the following objectives can be investigated:  
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1) To determine the effect of bargaining power on equilibrium solutions (wholesale 
price, retailer margin, service level, manufacturer and retailer profit) when the 
manufacturer or the retailer is a leader. 
 
2) To determine the effect of increase in production cost and market base on the 
channel’s decision variables (retailer margin, wholesale price and service levels).  
 
3) To determine the effect of increase in price and service competition index on the 
channel’s decision variables. 
 
Although the service competition between channel members in duopoly common 
retailers channel structure has not been investigated by retailer, therefore, providing 
service by retailer can not be neglected in real-life problems.  
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
 
In this supply chain structure a case where there are two manufacturers producing 
competing products was studied. Both of these manufacturers sell their products to 
both common retailers, who sell the products to the customer. 
 
It is assumed that the only decision variables were wholesale prices, service provided 
by the retailer, and retail margins. That is, each manufacturer produces a single 
product and decides its wholesale price, and then the retailers raise the sale price to 
their respective margins to determine retail prices. Only services provided by the 
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